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INTRODUCTION 
Disclosure is one of the central cornerstones of federal securities law. 
For a number of years, the primary focus of disclosure was directed to 
the public offering process. More recently, however, disclosure to the 
trading markets has achieved equal prominence. There has also been a 
growing recognition that investors need the benefit of forward-looking 
information. Not only has there been historical reluctance-now fast 
disappearing---to the use of forwarding-looking information, but the 
explosion of securities fraud lawsuits has also materially inhibited the 
use of forecasts and projections. This Article will examine recent 
developments in disclosure including current practices involving analysts, 
T + 3, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, and the use of forward-looking 
• Herbert S. Wander is a senior partner at Katten Muchin & Zavis in Chicago. 
Jonathan I. Cope is an associate at Katten Muchin & Zavis in Chicago. Jonathan 
Dariyanani is a swnmer associate at Katten Muchin & Zavis in Chicago. 
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information, including the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995. 
I. CURRENT PRACTICES OF INVOLVING ANALYSTS IN PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS 
A. Background 
Communication between issuer and analyst serves a significant market 
function in ensuring dissemination of information to the marketplace. 
As noted by the Supreme Court, "[t]he value to the entire market of 
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is 
significantly enhanced by [analysts'] initiatives to ferret out and analyze 
information and thus the analysts' work redounds to the benefit of all 
investors."1 
The benefits of issuer-analyst dialogue do not accrue solely to the 
investing public. The benefits to an issuer of communication with 
analysts, particularly in the context of an offering, are many. Issuer-
analyst interplay, however, has been described "as a fencing match 
conducted on a tightrope,"2 and, unless, artfully managed can result in 
both civil and criminal sanctions. For example, selective disclosure of 
material information to an analyst may be viewed as unlawful tipping in 
violation of Rule lOb-53 and thereby create a duty to make disclosure 
of the information to the public generally. Additionally, information 
conveyed to analysts about fluid business situations can tum out to be 
misleading and the practice of reviewing or correcting analysts' reports 
might make issuers responsible for the accuracy of the entire report and 
establish a duty to keep the information current. 
Current analysis of regulation of information stemming from nonpublic 
sources often centers around Dirks v. SEC,4 wherein the Supreme Court 
attempted to craft a line between permissible and impermissible 
disclosure. In Dirks, Raymond Dirks, a well-known investment analyst, 
was informed by a former employee of Equity Financing Corporation 
that the company was involved in massive financial fraud. Dirks 
investigated the allegations and exposed the company's fraud, but not 
before revealing the company's wrongdoings to his own clientele. The 
SEC concluded that "[i]n tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty 
I. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,658 n.17 (1983) (quoting 21 SEC Docket 1401, 
1406 ( 1981 )). 
2. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1977). 
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.!0b-5 (1996). 
4. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
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which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving confidential 
information from [Equity Funding] insiders. Tippees such as Dirks who 
receive non-public, material information from insiders become 'subject 
to the same duty as [the] insiders."'5 As noted by the Court, the SEC's 
theory of liability was "rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions 
require equal information among all traders."6 
The Court, however, rejected the notion that all traders must enjoy 
equal information before trading and ruled that those who receive 
material nonpublic information from insiders are not banned from 
trading unless ( l) the insider breached a fiduciary duty for personal gain, 
and (2) the recipient knew or should have known of the breach. 7 
Despite the Court's efforts to establish a clear line between permissible 
and impermissible disclosure, the SEC has continued to push for equal 
information among all market participants and has continued to bring 
enforcement actions because of selective disclosure, relying on theory 
which substantially dilutes the potency of Dirks.8 On the civil side, 
issuers have been sued by investors claiming entanglement between 
issuer and analyst and the failure of the issuer to update analysts' 
reports. Issuer and analyst have also faced a series ofrecent class action 
suits, wherein investors claim that issuer and analyst defraud investors 
by issuing overly optimistic research reports, thereby manipulating the 
issuer's stock price subsequent to an initial public offering (IPO). 
In the face of an erosion of Dirks and continued SEC enforcement for 
selective disclosure, as well as new entanglement theory, it is difficult 
to offer precise guidance as to an appropriate level of discourse between 
issuer and analyst, and, indeed, it is tempting to suggest that analysts 
should take greater refuge behind a "Chinese wall." However, as argued 
below, the benefit from issuer-analyst dialogue in the context of an 
offering outweighs the risks inherent in such relationships, particularly 
for issuers making an initial public offering. 
5. Id. at 655-56 (quoting Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
6. Id. at 657. 
7. Id. at 659. 
8. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Demise of Dirks: Shifting Standards for 
Tipper-Tippee Liability, INSIGHTS, June 1994, at 23. 
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B. Analysts Involved in Initial Public Offerings 
I. Benefits of Analyst Involvement 
In many ways the analyst is more indispensable to an issuer in the 
context of an IPO, as the public has no baseline from which informed 
investment decision-making can be made. Issuers generally recognize 
this and, indeed, often select an underwriter who has a known analyst. 
Moreover, the analyst is frequently involved in the offering process. 
Analysts, however, aside from getting a company's name in play, can 
also play a major role in an underwriter's due diligence process by 
identifying weaknesses in product, management, or business strategies 
because the analyst knows the industry and the competition. The analyst 
can also advise as to how a company's strengths and weaknesses should 
be disclosed in the company's prospectus. 
More significant is the analyst's involvement in developing earnings 
projections. As one commentator has pointed out: 
[I]nstitutional customers, in particular, will not buy !PO shares without 
[earnings] estimates. . . . Estimates therefore are provided orally to investors, 
either at road shows or by the sales force on the telephone. The issuer typically 
will not take responsibility for these estimates, leaving it in many cases to the 
investment bankers working on the !PO to supply estimates based on 
discussions with the issuer and access to internal projections. Investment 
bankers, however, are not always experienced in coming up with earnings 
estimates, and salespersons and customers alike may regard such estimates as 
"tainted" .... 
The analyst, on the other hand, is experienced in coming up with earnings 
estimates and has a track record of credibility with salespeople and customers. 
The analyst also is more likely to identify unrealistic assumptions built into the 
issuer's internal projections. For this reason, analysts are increasingly permitted 
access to the issuer's internal projections .... 9 
Because of the importance of analysts to the offering process, 
underwriters are often selected to lead an offering based on the ability 
or reputation of the firm's analysts. Of course, this is a two-way street, 
and analysts may be more willing to cover a particular company if the 
analyst's firm is selected to manage the underwriting. 
2. Costs of Analyst Involvement 
Once the offering is completed, the analyst generally publishes a 
research report on the issuer subsequent to the "cooling down" period. 
9. Joseph E. McLaughlin, The Changing Role of the Securities Analyst in Initial 
Public Offerings, INSIGHTS, Aug. 1994, at 6-7. 
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It is at this point that issuer and analyst alike generally are concerned 
that the analyst is "tainted" or possesses material nonpublic information, 
having participated in the due diligence process. It is also at this point 
that issuer and analyst risk enforcement by the SEC as well as civil suit. 
The SEC, as discussed below, has expanded the "personal benefits" 
test established by the Dirks Court and has argued that even enhance-
ment to reputation which does not result in pecuniary benefit is sufficient 
for a finding of insider trading. To our knowledge, the SEC has not 
prosecuted analysts on this theory. 
Issuers also face exposure to claims based on entanglement. 
Traditionally, entanglement theory holds that if a company puts its 
imprimatur, expressly or impliedly, on an analyst's report, the company 
will be deemed to have adopted the report, will be responsible for its 
accuracy, and will have a duty to update. Recently, a new form of 
entanglement theory has emerged. Plaintiffs have brought class action 
suits alleging that analysts and their firms have defrauded investors by 
issuing reports containing overly optimistic earnings forecasts and other 
projections, called "booster shots," thereby manipulating the issuer's 
stock price immediately after an IPO. This entanglement theory has 
been described as a "devil's bargain" whereby weak companies are 
brought public and the company's stock price is inflated until issuers' 
directors can sell out their personal holdings. 10 
These cases name analysts as individual defendants and suggest a 
complex conspiracy between issuer, analyst, and underwriter to defraud 
investors. As noted in one recent complaint: 
Defendants accomplished their scheme and common course of conduct 
through the issuance of a series of interrelated and interdependent false and 
misleading reports to shareholders, filings with the SEC, financial statements 
and press releases to the public, as well as approving the issuance of ( and 
reprinting) false and misleading analysts' reports which misrepresented the true 
facts regarding Coastcast's business, new products, manufacturing expertise, and 
future business prospects and created a false impression of continuing growth 
and future profitability. The Individual Defendants all benefitted from the 
illegal course of conduct by selling Coastcast stock owned by them at 
artificially inflated prices .... 11 
10. Jonathan C. Dickey, The New "Entanglement" Theory: Securities Analysts are 
Sued in Class Action Complaints, INSIGHTS, Mar. I 995, at 3. 
11. Stark v. Present, No. 94-5712, at 17 (C.D. Cal., filed Aug. 22, 1994). 
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As the above complaint illustrates, the "devil's bargain" suggests an 
intricate level of market manipulation over a sustained period of time. 
Several of the suits alleging this new form of entanglement have been 
voluntarily dismissed. It is unclear, however, how the trial courts will 
respond to these class action suits, especially in light of the fact that 
analysts apparently issue more favorable earnings forecasts and 
recommendations for their firm's underwriting clients than for issuers 
with whom they have no preexisting relationship. 12 
3. Cost Benefit Analysis 
Issuers should involve analysts in the due diligence phase of an IPO. 
While there is a risk of selective disclosure, there are sound business 
reasons for involving analysts in the IPO process which counterbalance 
these risks and which make an SEC argument of "personal benefit" less 
likely. As one author has noted: 
[T]he !PO issuer has eminently reasonable corporate business purposes in 
permitting an analyst full access to its internal information. These include 
permitting the underwriters to conduct more effective due diligence ... 
increasing the underwriters' confidence level in the issuer's business plan and 
projections, and assuring that the analyst's earnings estimates ... are in tum 
based on all available information about the issuer. Indeed, these business 
purposes are in full accord with the public policy of the Securities Act, which 
is to assure full disclosure to investors in securities distributed in the course of 
registered public offerings. 
By contrast, the corporate officers working on the IPO derive no personal 
benefit from the disclosure to the analyst. Even taking the SEC's broad views 
of "personal benefit" into consideration, this may be one of the few examples 
of a "completely business-justified disclosure" that should therefore be 
"immunized from liability."13 
With respect to liability on the basis of entanglement, as discussed 
below, entanglement claims are becoming increasingly difficult to sustain 
as the courts have recently required plaintiffs to plead specific facts such 
as time, place, and statements made, in order to withstand a motion to 
dismiss. 
Finally, an issuer can take additional measures to further guard against 
selective disclosure or entanglement law suits. For example, an issuer 
can designate a handful of corporate officers who can monitor written 
12. See H. Lin & M. McNichols, Underwriting Relationships in Analysts' Research 
Reports (Mar. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). See also Roni 
Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter 
Analyst Recommendations (Apr. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with San Diego 
Law Review). 
13. See McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 11. 
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or oral information supplied to the analyst. An issuer can also adopt a 
written policy statement indicating how far they will participate with the 
analyst in the due diligence process and that the company will not 
review the analyst's projections. If the company does elect to review the 
analyst's report, it can provide a disclaimer describing the purpose of the 
review. Such a disclaimer may include the following: 
Our review of the report has been limited to the accuracy of the factual 
information contained therein as of the date of our review. As a matter of 
corporate policy, we do not comment on analysts' projections or earnings 
estimates and our review of the report should not in any manner be viewed as 
agreement or acquiescence on our part with the projections, predictions or 
opinions set forth therein. 
In addition, we assume no responsibility to provide you with any material 
information which may not be included in the report or to update any 
information which may become inaccurate following our review. 14 
C. Analyst Participation in Public Offerings of 
Already-Public Companies 
Analysts in the majority of offerings involving already-public issuers 
generally participate in the due diligence process and contribute the same 
insights to the process as discussed above. However, analysts generally 
do not participate in obtaining projections from the company and the 
need for a "Chinese wall" between analysts and investment banking firm 
is even greater than in the IPO setting because the analyst is already in 
communication with the company's stockholders. 
Some commentators have noted that analysts refrain from publishing 
detailed reports about a company if a company is making a public 
offering. While there are limitations imposed on analysts circulating 
reports during an offering, analysts should probably avail themselves of 
Rules 138 and 139 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 
Act), 15 defining the circumstances under which a report is not deemed 
to be an offer for the sale of securities. 
14. James J. Junewicz, Handling Wall Street Analysts, INSIGHTS, Jan. 1995, at 9, 
14. One author has suggested that underwriters, in order to minimize their exposure, 
should obtain issuer consent where an analyst will participate in all facets of the due 
diligence process and then publish a post-offering analysis. See McLaughlin, supra note 
9. We are not aware of any underwriting firms which deliver such a letter other than 
Goldman Sachs. 
15. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.138, 230.139 (1996); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a-l/ (1994 & West Supp. 1996). 
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Rule 139 provides that with respect to an issuer who proposes to file 
or who has filed a registration statement, a publication by a broker or 
dealer of an opinion with respect to the registrant will not be deemed to 
be an offer to sell securities even though such broker or dealer is a 
participant in the distribution of such securities if: 
(a) (I) The registrant meets the registrant requirements of Form S-3 ... and 
such information, opinion or recommendation is contained in a publication 
which is distributed with reasonable regularity in the normal course of business; 
or ... 
(b )(I) [Fornon-Form S-3 issuers,] [ s ]uch information, opinion or recommen-
dation is contained in a publication which: 
(i) Is distributed with reasonable regularity in the normal course of business 
and 
(ii) Includes similar information, opinions or recommendations with respect 
to a substantial number of companies in the registrant's industry, or sub-
industry, or contains a comprehensive list of securities currently recommended 
by such broker or dealer. 
(2) Such information, opinion or recommendation is given no materially 
greater space or prominence in such publication than that given to other 
securities or registrants; and 
(3) an opinion or recommendation as favorable or more favorable as to the 
registrant or any class of its securities was published by the broker or dealer in 
the last publication of such broker or dealer addressing the registrant or its 
securities prior to the commencement of participation in the distribution. 16 
D. What Do the Cases Say? 
I. Selective Disclosure 
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella v. 
United States17 and Dirks v. SEC, 18 a duty to disclose or refrain from 
trading on the basis of material nonpublic information arises only when 
such trading constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. In Dirks, the Court 
ruled that "[w]hether disclosure is a breach of duty ... depends in large 
part on the purpose of the disclosure. . . . Thus, the test is whether the 
insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclo-
sure."19 The Court defined personal benefit as a "pecuniary gain or a 
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings."20 
In March 1991, the SEC applied the Dirks "personal benefits" test in 
SEC v. Stevens. 21 In Stevens, the SEC charged a corporate executive 
16. 17 C.F.R. § 230.139 (1996). 
17. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
18. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
I 9. Id. at 662. 
20. Id. at 663. 
21. SEC v. Stevens, 48 S.E.C. Docket 739, 1991 WL 296537 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 
1991); see also SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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of Ultrasystems, Inc., with unlawful tipping when he called a few 
analysts who provided research coverage of the company to let them 
know of an anticipated earnings decline. The SEC alleged that Stevens 
placed these calls "to protect and enhance his reputation" as a corporate 
manager, and therefore the calls had "direct, tangible benefit to his status 
as a corporate manager."22 
After Stevens' calls, two of the analysts called their clients, who then 
sold Ultrasystems' stock prior to Ultrasystems' issuance of a press 
release announcing its lower-than-expected revenues and earnings. The 
SEC alleged that the loss avoided by these clients was "of at least 
$126,455."23 Stevens agreed to pay the $126,455 as well as to be 
permanently enjoined from violating section 17(a) of the Securities Act 
of 1933 (1933 Act)24 and section lO(b) of the 1934 Act. 
Stevens stretches the "reputational benefit" test of Dirks to its limit. 
There was no allegation that Stevens received any type of substantial 
reputational benefit that "translates into future eamings."25 The danger 
of the Commission's rationale in Stevens is that virtually all selective 
disclosures are likely to have been made on some element of personal 
motivation.26 Thus, any executive, even one who is driven by a desire 
to serve the corporation, may be charged with deriving a "reputational 
benefit" when he or she communicates with analysts. Steven's monetary 
liability, representing the trading profits of remote tippees, further serves 
as a significant in terroram deterrent for executives who deal with 
analysts. 
2. Entanglement Cases 
Entanglement theory presents two distinct problems for an issuer 
involved in dialogue with an analyst. First, an issuer may become 
responsible for what is contained in an analyst's report, including the 
22. Stevens, I 991 WL 296537, at • I. 
23. Id. at *2. 
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1994 & West Supp. 1996). 
25. Stevens, 1991 WL 296537, at •1. 
26. See Edward H. Fleischman, Ferreting in the Interstices of S.E.C. Attitudes to 
Securities Analysts, Address to the Eighteenth Annual Securities Regulation Institute, 
University of California, San Diego (Jan. 24, 1991) (transcript available at San Diego 
Law Review). Former SEC commissioner Fleischman suggested that every corporate 
officer who communicates with analysts could be viewed as seeking to build, preserve, 
redeem or maintain his or her reputation with analysts. Id. at 8. 
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analyst's own projections, even where the company does not want to 
comment on some of the findings included in the analyst's report. 
Second, as a result of an analyst's report being attributable to the 
company, the company may have a duty to update and correct material 
errors or omissions contained in the analyst's report. 
In the leading case of Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 27 the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether an issuer has a 
continuing duty to correct analyst reports where the defendant company 
instituted a policy ofregularly meeting with analysts and reviewing their 
reports. The court held that management did not assume a continuing 
duty to correct the analysts' projections because, while company 
personnel would correct factual errors in the reports, it had generally not 
commented on earnings projections. The court explained that: 
[T]he controversy before us is whether Liggett sufficiently entangled itself with 
the analysts' forecasts to render those predictions "attributable to it" . . . . We 
have no doubt that a company may so involve itself in the preparation of 
reports and projections by outsiders as to assume a duty to correct material 
errors in those projections. This may occur when officials of the company 
have, by their activity, made an implied representation that the information they 
have reviewed is true or at least in accordance with the company's views.28 
After reviewing the facts, the court of appeals affirmed the district 
court's finding that Liggett "did not place its imprimatur, expressly or 
impliedly, on the analysts' projections."29 The court warned, however, 
that: 
[C]orporate pre-release review of the reports of analysts is a risky activity, 
fraught with danger. . . . A company which undertakes to correct errors in 
reports presented to it for review may find itself forced to choose between 
raising no objection to a statement which, because it is contradicted by internal 
information, may be misleading and making that information public at a time 
when corporate interests would best be served by confidentiality. 30 
One difficulty plaintiffs encounter in pleading entanglement is that the 
courts increasingly have required specific facts which definitively link 
an analyst's statements to insiders of the company. In Raab v. Gen. 
Physics Corp.,31 stockholders of General Physics sued the corporation, 
claiming it had misled investors through false statements to analysts and 
the media.32 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for 
failure to plead specific facts supporting their allegations of fraud, and 
27. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). 
28. Id. at 163. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. 4 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 1993). 
32. Id. at 288. 
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the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, 
holding that plaintiffs had not pied specific facts from which the 
analyst's report could be attributed to the company.33 The court 
concluded that "soft" or "puffing" statements are generally not material 
because the market price is not driven by such vague declarations.34 
The court also concluded that the company's statement that profits 
should be in line with analysts' current projections did not constitute a 
guarantee that earnings would be forthcoming in particular amounts. 
The court considered this forecast not to be material. 35 
Recent case law, particularly in California, has also been very 
favorable, making it difficult for plaintiffs to plead entanglement. In In 
re Time Warner Sec. Litig.,36 plaintiffs alleged that statements made by 
unidentified Time Warner insiders in discussions with analysts and 
newspaper reporters misled the public by suggesting that Time Warner 
would reduce certain outstanding debt.37 The court, in upholding the 
district court's dismissal pursuant to Rule 9(b), ruled that the circum-
stances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity and noted that 
"at a minimum ... the plaintiff [must] identify the speaker of the 
allegedly fraudulent statements."38 
Following Time Warner, a number of California district courts have 
required plaintiffs to plead specific facts to withstand a motion to 
dismiss and have articulated which facts plaintiffs must set forth in their 
complaint. In Fisher v. Acuson Corp., the court, citing Time Warner, 
noted that: 
[T]he heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) require plaintiffs who are 
claiming that insiders are liable for third party financial analysts' statements to 
show adoption by alleging the following: (I) specific reports and the name of 
the insider who adopted them; (2) specific interactions between the insider and 
the analyst; and (3) dates on which the interactions occurred.39 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 289. 
35. Id. at 29 I. 
36. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993). 
37. Id. at 262. 
38. Id. at 265. Echoing the Dirks court, the Second Circuit noted that "the 
function of financial reporters and security analysts is to determine the truth about the 
affairs of publicly traded companies." Id. 
39. Fisher v. Acuson Corp., No. C93-20477RMW(EAI), 1995 WL 261439, at •7 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1995); see also Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); 
In re Cypress Semiconductor, 891 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1995). But see In re 
RasterOps Corp. Sec. Litig., (1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 
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The heightened pleading requirements of Fisher appear to be the 
current trend in entanglement cases, though it is unclear whether the 
courts will continue to move in this direction.40 
A Second Circuit opinion recently adopted a similar line of reasoning. 
In San Leandro Emerg. Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Phillip 
Morris Cos.,41 plaintiffs alleged that the cigarette maker failed to 
disclose plans to lower prices on its flagship Marlboro brand.42 
Plaintiffs alleged that failure to disclose this information rendered several 
statements made in analyst meetings and press releases misleading, 
including statements that the company would deliver consistent income 
growth. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal of the complaint, stating that Philip Morris' announcement that 
it expected Marlboro to perform well and that the company was 
"optimistic about its earnings" was mere puffery.43 
E. Conclusion 
Analysts should continue to work with issuers in both initial public 
offerings and offerings for publicly held companies. Issuers should, 
however, adopt policy statements indicating their level of involvement 
with analysts and their stance on reviewing analysts' reports. Issuers 
should also adopt internal guidelines which clearly articulate who is 
responsible for communication with analysts and who will review any 
materials supplied to analysts. 
II. T + 3 
Effective June 7, 1995, Rule 15c6-144 establishes that the standard 
settlement time for most broker-dealer trades is three business days after 
the trade, or "T + 3."45 When Rule 15c6-1 was first proposed, 
98,467 (Oct. 3 I, I 994) (ruling that plaintiffs need only allege insiders provided false 
information, approved drafts of analysts' reports, and circulated reports to investors). 
40. See also In re Seagate Techn. II Sec. Litig., [I 994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 98,530 (Feb. 8, 1995) (citing Elkind, 635 F.2d 156, to support 
ruling that guidance alone does not make a company liable for analyst's forecast); Gross 
v. Summa Four, Inc., [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 98,999 
(Nov. 8, 1995) (ruling that a company's predictive statements which lacked specificity 
failed to meet the materiality requirement under Rule !Ob-5). 
41. 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 1996). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 81 I. 
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240. l 5c6-l (1993). 
45. See Prospectus Delivery; Securities Transactions Settlement, Exchange Act 
Release No. 33-7168, Release No. 34-35705, 59 S.E.C. Docket 550 (May 11, 1995) 
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commentators expressed concern that settlement within T + 3 would not 
be feasible because of the amount of time it would take to print and 
deliver prospectuses.46 Two proposals to simplify prospectus delivery 
were submitted to the commission: The "Four Firms" proposal and the 
Securities Industry Association (SIA) approach.47 
A. The Four Firms Proposal 
The Four Firms proposal was based on the view that most of the 
prospectus could be printed before pricing to facilitate delivery within 
T + 3, if certain modifications were made to existing SEC rules.48 Six 
of the key modifications are summarized below. 
1. Re-Ordering of Prospectuses 
The SEC's rule revisions allow issuers to present information that 
becomes available or is likely to change at the time of pricing to be 
included together either in the beginning of the prospectus after the front 
cover page in a "pricing-related information" section or wrapped around 
the prospectus inside the front and back cover pages.49 The pricing-
related information section may include use of proceeds, capitalization, 
proforma financial information, dilution, selling shareholder information, 
and shares eligible for future sale, among others. If the pricing-related 
information is included after the front cover page, the prospectus 
summary and risk factors sections may appear immediately following the 
pricing-related section. Additionally, disclosure regarding availability of 
1934 Act information, nature of reports to be given to security holders, 
undertakings with respect to information incorporated by reference, and 
enforceability of civil liabilities against foreign persons, required on the 
prospectus cover page, may be placed elsewhere in the prospectus. 
[hereinafter Adopting Release]. 
46. The SEC noted that prospectus delivery concerns should be alleviated as 
electronic delivery becomes more prevalent. Id. § I. 
47. Id. The Four Firms include CS First Boston Corporation, Goldman Sachs & 
Co., Lehman Brothers, Inc., and Morgan Stanley & Co. Id. 
48. Id. § II(A). 
49. Id. § l(A)(I ). To ensure that investors continue to easily locate the "risk 
factors" section of the prospectus, the SEC also requires that the cover page of the 
prospectus identify the page number at which that section appears in the prospectus and 
that the risk factors section be labeled as "Risk Factors." 
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2. Changes in Offering, Size, or Price 
An issuer is permitted to register securities by specifying only the title 
of the class being registered and the proposed maximum offering 
price. 50 However, the issuer is still required to specify in the prospec-
tus the amount of securities being offered and, if the issuer is not a 
reporting company, a bona fide estimate of the range of the maximum 
offering price. The aggregate dollar amount associated with each class 
of securities must be disclosed in the registration fee table. If the issuer 
registers more shares than required in the offering, the excess securities 
may be carried forward to subsequent registrations of the same class of 
securities. 
Where the size of an offering increases subsequent to pricing, the 
issuer is eligible to use an abbreviated registration statement to register 
additional securities, provided that the additional shares represent no 
more than a twenty percent increase over the shares previously 
registered.51 This abbreviated registration statement includes the facing 
page, a statement incorporating by reference the contents of the prior 
filing, all required consents and opinions, and the signature page. It may 
also include any price-related information with respect to the offering 
that was omitted from the earlier registration statement pursuant to Rule 
43OA. The abbreviated registration statement must be filed prior to the 
time sales are made and confirmation is given, and is effective upon 
filing.52 
Where the size or the price of an offering declared effective under 
Rule 43OA do not in the aggregate deviate more than twenty percent 
from the price set forth in the registration fee table of the effective 
filing, a post-effective amendment is not required. Additionally, where 
there is a change in offering size or deviation from the price range 
beyond the twenty percent threshold, a post-effective amendment is 
required only if such change materially changes the previous disclo-
sure.53 The release does, however, indicate that "issuers continue to be 
responsible for evaluating the effect of a volume change or price 
50. Id. § II(A)(2)(a). 
51. Id. § II(A)(2)(b). 
52. Id. Abbreviated filing is allowed even where pricing occurs after the SEC 
offices have closed. Electronic filers may file via Edgar and others may file by fax, 
between 5:30 and 10:00 p.m. Eastern time. Payment may be made after banking hours 
by instructing a bank to wire no later than the close of the next business day after filing 
and providing certain certifications to the SEC with the filing. Id. 
53. Id. § Il(A)(2)(c). 
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deviation on the accuracy and completeness of disclosure made to 
investors. "54 
3. Manual Signatures and Incorporating by Reference 
Opinions and Consents 
The SEC now permits duplicate or facsimile signature to be used in 
lieu of manual signatures for any registration filed under the 1934 
Act.55 If facsimile or duplicate signatures are used, the registrant must 
maintain the manually signed version for five years and provide it to the 
SEC upon request. 
4. Rule 430A Pricing Period 
Rule 430A previously provided that a registration could be declared 
effective without pricing information if the missing information was 
contained in a supplemental prospectus filed five days after the effective 
date of the registration statement. 56 The SEC extended the pricing 
period to fifteen days, principally to reduce the likelihood that a post-
effective amendment would have to be filed. 
5. Acceleration Request 
The SEC now permits requests for acceleration of effectiveness to be 
transmitted either via facsimile or orally. 57 A letter indicating that the 
registrant and managing underwriter intend to request oral acceleration 
must be submitted to the Commission prior to the oral acceleration 
request.58 
6. T + 4 For Firm Commitment Offerings Priced 
After the Close of the Market 
Firm commitment offerings priced after 4:30 p.m. Eastern Standard 
Time, where the securities are sold by an issuer to an underwriter or a 
54. See id. at n.32. 
55. Id. § II(A)(3). 
56. Id. § II(A)(4). 
57. Id. § II(A)( 6). 
58. The letter should also indicate that the registrant and the managing underwriter 
are aware of their obligations under the 1933 Act. Id. 
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broker-dealer participating in an offering, are governed by a T + 4 
settlement time frame. 59 The T + 4 period also applies to a secondary 
offering where the issuer and managing underwriter agree in writing that 
such a settlement period will apply. In addition, the Commission has 
provided an "override" provision to T + 3 for the sale of all securities 
subject to a firm commitment offering upon agreement by the managing 
underwriter and the issuer. The Commission has stressed, however, 
"that the override provision is not intended to dilute the presumption in 
favor of application of the T + 3 settlement cycle in connection with 
firm commitment offerings."60 Instead, the override provision is 
intended to be used only in those circumstances when T + 3 settlement 
is not feasible. 
B. SIA Proposal 
As adopted by the Commission, the SIA approach provides for 
incremental prospectus delivery.61 For offerings registered on forms 
other than S-3 or F-3, prospectus delivery is accomplished by delivery 
of a rzreliminary prospectus, a term sheet, if necessary, and a confirma-
tion. 2 The term sheet provides all information material to investors 
that is not disclosed in the preliminary prospectus. The preliminary 
prospectus and term sheet, taken together, may not materially differ from 
the disclosure included in the effective registration statement. The term 
sheet must be filed with the Commission within two business days after 
the earlier of the pricing date or first use.63 
For registrants using short-form registration, delivery may be 
accomplished by delivery of a preliminary prospectus, an abbreviated 
term sheet, and a confirmation. 64 The abbreviated term sheet must 
include, unless described in the preliminary prospectus or incorporated 
by reference, a description of the securities (as required by Item 202 of 
Regulation S-K) and information regarding material changes (as required 
by Item 11 of Form S-3). Offering-specific information usually 
contained in the final prospectus, such as use of proceeds and plan of 
59. Id. § II(A)(7). 
60. Id. § III. 
61. Id. § 11(8). 
62. Id. § II(BXl). 
63. Id. One author has noted that while a term sheet may be effective to quickly 
update pricing information it may be the less attractive alternative where the form of 
prospectus included in the registration statement at the time of effectiveness has been 
significantly modified compared to the preliminary prospectus delivered to investors. 
Memorandum from Nicholas Grabar, Compliance with Prospectus Delivery Requirements 
in a T + 3 Settlement Environment (May 17, 1995) (on file with authors). 
64. Adopting Release, supra note 45, § Il(B)(2). 
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distribution, may not be physically delivered to investors and, instead, 
is required only in the prospectus supplement filed with the Commission. 
It is unclear how comfortable underwriters will be in delivering 
abbreviated prospectuses or term sheets to investors or in deviating 
significantly from the current ordering of information contained in a 
prospectus. Our own experience has been that few issuers have availed 
themselves of abbreviated prospectus delivery.65 
III. RISK FACTORS 
Risk factors have become a common section in many prospectuses 
even for seasoned companies. The risk factors section is helpful in 
establishing the "bespeaks caution" doctrine. It is also a useful section 
to ensure the issuer's disclosure is complete. There is generally some 
discussion as to whether the risk factors section should be drafted prior 
to the rest of the prospectus or only after all other items in the prospec-
tus have been drafted. We generally try to write the risk factors section 
after everything else is complete, to ensure that we have identified the 
specific risks associated with a particular issuer. 66 
IV. "BESPEAKS CAUTION" DOCTRINE 
A recurrent theme of cases dealing with forward-looking information 
is that the issuer reaffirmed prior projections through general expressions 
of optimism or by confirming its goals at a time when the issuer knew 
or should have known that identified problems with products or 
operations threatened its ability to achieve the earlier projections. These 
allegations often are commingled with sundry other counts constituting 
a Rule lOb-5 action. Defendants have a difficult burden dismissing 
these claims where internal memoranda, statements to third parties, or 
other "smoking guns" contradict the issuer's public statements. Issuers 
should beware that virtually any public expression of optimism could be 
construed as a reaffirmation of prior forward-looking statements. 
65. Financial printers whom we contacted have indicated that they have not had 
any problems meeting a T + 3 deadline. Additionally, they have indicated that issuers 
and underwriters alike have not wanted to be "first on the block" to deliver tenn sheets 
or abbreviated prospectuses. 
66. For an account of recent changes brought about by the Private Securities 
Litigation Refonn Act of 1995, see infra Part V.B. 
1043 
Certain other cases suggest that issuers may avoid liability for 
projections and other predictive information when such information is 
accompanied by certain risk disclosure. This bespeaks caution doctrine 
holds that when precise cautionary language that directly addresses itself 
to future projections, estimates, or forecasts is used, such projections, 
estimates, or forecasts cannot be misleading as a matter of law.67 This 
doctrine does not apply, however, when the speaker knows he is making 
untrue statements.68 Regardless of the "matter of law" rhetoric used 
when speaking of this doctrine, as illustrated by the cases below, and in 
light of certain statements made by the Supreme Court in Virginia 
Bankshares Inc. v. Sandberg,69 the application of the bespeaks caution 
doctrine is, indeed, a case-by-case factual analysis. 
The following cases demonstrate that, regardless of any safe harbor or 
disclosure of risk factors and underlying factual assumptions, forward-
looking statements will be subject to a plaintiff's 20/20 hindsight and 
may be actionable under the federal securities laws. On the brighter 
side, the Ninth Circuit's recent adoption of the bespeaks caution doctrine 
in In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig. 70 shows that issuers may indeed 
find protection when cautionary language is specific and not gener-
ic-but, as recently emphasized by the Ninth Circuit in Fecht v. Price 
Co.,71 the cautionary language must be specific. 
67. The rationale for some courts in applying this doctrine is that where there is 
enough cautionary language attached to optimistic statements, investors have no right to 
rely on only the optimistic statements. For a more detailed discussion of the bespeaks 
caution doctrine, see Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution, " 49 
Bus. LAW. 481 (1994). It has been argued, however, that "even caution-laden disclosures 
may have the propensity to mislead" because "the presence of cautionary language 
actually may make the projections more influential." Id. at 497-98. Thus, it can be 
argued that courts which assume that cautionary language automatically negates 
optimistic statements would be erroneously applying the doctrine. Id. at 497. The other 
rationale expressed by the courts is that the cautionary language so dilutes the disclosure 
that no reasonable person would find an optimistic message. Id. at 487. See also infra 
Part 111.3, for a discussion of Rubinstein v. Collins. 
68. But see In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 553 
(D.N.J. 1992), ajf'd, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), and cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1178 
(1994)("The 'bespeaks caution' analysis subsumes the misrepresentation analysis. No 
reasonable inference can be drawn in favor of a plaintiff that a ... statement which 
bespeaks caution as to future forecasts contains actionable misrepresentations." 793 F. 
Supp. at 553). See also Langevoort, supra note 67, at 488. 
69. 501 U.S. 1083 (1991). In Virginia Bankshares, the Supreme Court held that 
statements by management of reasons, opinions, or beliefs, even though conclusory in 
form, may be material facts that could give rise to misstatement liability under the 
federal securities laws. Id. at I 083-84. 
70. 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994). 
71. 70 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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In the recently enacted Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (Reform Act),72 Congress provided for a statutory safe harbor for 
many forward-looking statements based in part upon the bespeaks 
caution doctrine, which is discussed in Part V.B of this Article. Some 
examples of risk factors language used in recent public filings can be 
found in Appendix A. Examples of cautionary language used in press 
releases pursuant to the safe harbor provision of the Reform Act can be 
found in Appendix B. 
1. In re Donald Trump Casino Securities Litigation 
In In re Donald Trump Casino Sec. Litig.,13 investors who purchased 
bonds to provide financing for the Taj Mahal alleged that the prospectus 
which accompanied the bond offering contained materially misleading 
statements and omissions regarding, among other matters, defendant's 
belief that operation of the Taj Mahal would generate enough money to 
cover its debt service. The language from the Management Discussion 
and Analysis section stated: "The Partnership believes that funds 
generated from the operation of the Taj Mahal will be sufficient to cover 
all of its debt service (interest and principal)."74 However, the above 
statement was followed by a warning: "No assurance can be given, 
however, that the actual operating results will meet the Partnership's 
expectations. See 'Special Considerations-Ability of the Partnership to 
Service Debt. "'75 The referenced subsection listed several specific risk 
factors and scenarios under .which the contemplated adverse effects 
would materialize.76 
The district court dismissed the action, applying the bespeaks caution 
doctrine and stating that the prospectus "virtually bristle[ d] with 
warnings" concerning the "extremely risky nature of the investment."77 
The Third Circuit subsequently affirmed the lower court's ruling, 
concluding that, in light of the disclaimers contained in the prospectus, 
72. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (West Supp. 1995) (codified in scattered 
sections of 15. U.S.C.) [hereinafter Reform Act]. 
73. 793 F. Supp. 543, 554 (D.N.J. 1992), ajf'd, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 1178 ( 1994 ). 
74. 793 F. Supp. at 555. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 554. 
77. Id. at 555. 
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"no reasonable investor could believe anything but that the Taj Mahal 
bonds represented a rather risky, speculative investment."78 The court 
stated that: 
(W]hen an offering document's forecasts, opinions or projections are accompa-
nied by meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-looking statements will 
not form the basis for a securities fraud claim if those statements did not affect 
the "total mix" of information the document provided investors. In other words, 
cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or misrepresen-
tations immaterial as a matter of law. 79 
On March 7, 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the federal 
appeals court's decision to stand. 
2. Sinay and Mayer 
In Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co.,80 the Sixth Circuit held that the 
issuer's optimistic statements regarding its performance and confirmation 
of an analyst's earnings estimates were not misleading where the 
predictions bespoke sufficient caution. The issuer also could not predict 
a decline in the construction market nor a devastating labor strike any 
better than the public. 
But in Mayer v. Mylod,81 the Sixth Circuit appears to have backed 
down from the bespeaks caution doctrine in light of the Supreme Court's 
statements in Virginia Bankshares that, while publishing accurate facts 
can render misleading statements too unimportant as to create liability, 
not every mixture of the true will neutralize the deceptive. In Mayer, 
the Sixth Circuit overturned the district court's application of Sinay to 
several statements of "opinion" made by a Michigan bank, holding that 
Virginia Bankshares requires a weighing of the true with the untrue and 
thus cautionary statements cannot "as a matter of law" render optimistic 
statements unactionable. 82 
3. Rubinstein v. Collins 
In Rubinstein v. Collins,83 the Fifth Circuit stated that "cautionary 
language is not necessarily sufficient, in and of itself, to render 
predictive statements immaterial as a matter of law."84 Thus, while 
78. 7 F.3d at 369. 
79. Id. at 371. 
80. 948 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1991). 
81. 988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993). 
82. Id. at 637. 
83. 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994). 
84. Id. at 167. 
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"[i]nclusion of cautionary language-along with disclosure of any firm-
specific adverse facts or assumptions--is, of course, relevant to the 
materiality inquiry . . . cautionary language as such is not per se 
dispositive of this inquiry."85 
In Rubinstein, Plains Resources, Inc. (Plains), one of the defendants 
to the suit, announced on August 19, 1991, that it had made a significant 
natural gas discovery which was characterized as "substantial. "86 
Initial tests of the discovery were conducted, and analysts subsequently 
gave optimistic opinions about high yields from the discovery. On 
October 23, 1991, Defendant-Appellee Armstrong, Chief Financial 
Officer of Plains, was reported to have characterized as "realistic" an 
analyst's opinion that, among other things, the asset value of Plains was 
between $66 to $100 per share.87 In November 1991, Plains filed a 
registration statement for a proposed secondary public offering which 
reiterated the initial test results, as well as asserting: 
Although there is insufficient production history and other data available to 
definitively quantify the proved reserves attributable to this discovery, the 
Company believes . . . that the ... well is a significant discovery that, when 
fully evaluated, could add substantially to the Company's oil and natural gas 
reserves. There can be no assurance, however, that subsequent production, 
drilling and other data will not cause the Company to reevaluate its assessment 
of the significance of this discovery. 88 
Similar statements were made in the prospectus that accompanied the 
offering. 
Plaintiff alleged that this registration statement, as well as the October 
23rd statements, was misleading because the defendants knew that the 
discovery testing done up to that time "was not sufficient to provide a 
reasonable basis for these statements, and failed to disclose the declines 
in flow-tube and shut-in pressures."89 On December 4, 1991, the 
defendants beW<an to disclose some of the adverse information regarding 
the discovery. ° Five days later, however, Plains' CEO announced that 
the discovery was up and running and was producing gas and condensate 
85. Id. at 168 (footnotes omitted). 
86. Id. at 162-63. 
87. Id. at 163. 
88. Id. at 163-64. 
89. Id. at 164. 
90. Id. 
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at levels seen before the recent sharp drop in flow-tube pressure.91 On 
January 24, 1992, the planned public offering took place. Then, on 
March 30, 1992, Plains filed its 10-K report in which it reiterated the 
October test results for the discovery.92 Finally, on April 13, 1992, an 
analyst publicly reported. that the discovery well had reserves with a 
value of less than $2 million, which would not even cover the actual 
cost of the well.93 
The plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated section IO(b) and 
section 20(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule !Ob-5 thereunder, as well as 
violating certain state laws. The district court dismissed these claims 
because the statements by defendants "were made in good faith, 
suggested reliability and bespoke caution."94 According to the district 
court, "positive economic forecasts and predictions such as those made 
by defendants may not form the basis of a securities fraud action when 
such statements are couched in cautionary language."95 
The Fifth Circuit subsequently overturned the district court's decision 
to grant the motion to dismiss, stating that the district court had applied 
the bespeaks caution doctrine too broadly.96 In its decision, the Fifth 
Circuit declined to follow Sinay and instead cited Mayer favorably.97 
Thus, it appears that some courts will continue to back down from the 
bespeaks caution doctrine, as Mayer and Rubinstein reveal, and instead 
find that statements couched in cautionary language are merely part of 
the "total mix of information" that courts look to in determining liability. 
Conversely, the bespeaks caution doctrine has gained support in other 
courts, as In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.,98 discussed below, 
illustrates. 
4. In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation 
In Worlds of Wonder, the Ninth Circuit adopted the bespeaks caution 
doctrine and affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants regarding the textual part of the Debenture Prospectus.99 
Worlds of Wonder (WOW) was formed in 1985 and quickly achieved 
huge success with its two lines of toys: Teddy Ruxpin and Lazer Tag. 
91. Id. 




96. Id. at 167. 
97. Id. at n.21. 
98. 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994). 
99. Id. at 1423-24. 
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Hoping to fund further expansion, WOW conducted a debenture offering 
in June of 1987, raising $80 million. 100 This additional infusion of 
capital was inadequate to sustain WOW's uncontrolled growth and, in 
addition to sluggish sales in the 1987 Christmas season, led to WOW 
filing for bankruptcy on December 21, 1987 .101 Several purchasers of 
WOW debentures subsequently filed this class action, alleging that the 
prospectus accompanying the offering was false and misleading in 
violations of sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act and section lO(b) of 
the 1934 Act. 102 
The district court below had found that where a prospectus contains 
extensive discussions of the specific risks inherent in investing in a start-
up toy company, optimistic statements about such investment are not 
misleading as a matter of law.103 The district court stated that "it does 
not matter if the optimistic statements are later found to have been 
inaccurate or based on erroneous assumptions when made, provided that 
the risk disclosure was conspicuous, specific, and adequately disclosed 
the assumptions upon which the optimistic language was based."104 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered the issue whether the district 
court erred by adopting and applying the bespeaks caution doctrine. The 
Ninth Circuit began its discussion of the doctrine by noting that at least 
six circuits have adopted some form of the bespeaks caution doc-
trine. 105 The court further stated that "the doctrine, when properly 
construed, merely represents the pragmatic application of two fundamen-
tal concepts in the law of securities fraud: materiality and reliance." 106 
The Ninth Circuit then found that the district court had applied the 
doctrine narrowly and thus affirmed the district court's summary 
judgment in favor of defendants. The court stated: 
To prevent [an overbroad application of the doctrine], the bespeaks caution 
doctrine applies only to precise cautionary language which directly addresses 
itself to future projections, estimates or forecasts in a prospectus. By contrast, 
blanket warnings that securities involve a high depee of risk (are] insufficient 
to ward against a federal securities fraud claim. 10 
100. Id. at 1411. 
101. Id. at 1412. 
102. Id. 
103. 814 F. Supp. 850, 858-59 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
I 04. Id. at 858. 
105. 35 F.3d at 1413. 
106. Id. at 1414. 
107. Id. at 1414. 
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5. Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., Inc. 
In Harden v. Rajfensperger, Hughes & Co., Inc., 108 plaintiffs alleged 
that Raffensperger, as underwriter, was liable for among other things, 
misstatements concerning the issuer's ability to secure insurance and its 
plans to restore company profitability. 109 Raffensperger argued that 
sufficient cautionary language was used in connection with the alleged 
misstatements so that it could rely on a bespeaks caution defense. " 0 
In rejecting Raffensperger's arguments, the court noted: 
Essentially, Raffensperger contends that the word "plans" used in this statement 
means "future efforts" rather than existing methods, ideas, or means of 
achieving some goal. We cannot agree. . . . Contrary to Raffensperger's 
attempt to portray the "plans to restore [profitability] statement" as containing 
solelv "soft information," the statement constitutes a present assertion of fact 
,11 
And again, with respect to the issuer's cautionary statement regarding 
its efforts to secure insurance the court found: 
[The company] knew, prior to the issuance of the registration statement, that 
there was in fact no possibility of such approval and omitted to disclose this 
fact. The information ... does not concern subjective or "soft information," 
but rather "hard facts." The bespeaks caution doctrine does not, as a matter of 
law, offset the materiality of such information. 112 
The court's distinction between "hard" and "soft" information has lead 
some commentators to suggest that the decision cuts back on the 
bespeaks caution defense. However, the court's emphasis on the 
language used by defendant in preparing the registration statement 
suggests that more concise drafting by issuer and underwriter may 
preserve a bespeaks caution argument even if the cautionary language 
concerns hard facts. 
6. Fecht v. Price Company 
In late 1995, the Ninth Circuit signaled that it will carefully review 
dismissals of securities fraud claims based upon the bespeaks caution 
doctrine in Fecht v. Price Co. 113 The court quoted its ruling in In re 
Worlds of Wonder, but went on to state: 
108. 65 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1995). 
I 09. Id. at I 395. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 1405. 
112. Id. at 1406 (footnote omitted). 
113. 70 F.3d I 078 (9th Cir. I 995). 
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The "bespeaks caution" doctrine is thus wholly consistent with our analysis that 
whether a statement in a public document is misleading may be determined as 
a matter of law only when reasonable minds could not disagree as to whether 
the mix of information in the document is misleading. Inclusion of some 
cautionary language is not enough to support a determination as a matter of law 
that defendants' statements were not misleading. 114 
In early 1996, the Ninth Circuit made clear that it considered Pecht to 
be the controlling case for reviewing dismissals based on the bespeaks 
caution doctrine. In Warshaw v. Xoma, 115 the court applied the Pecht 
standard to a dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, concluding that 
effective cautionary language must be so obvious that reasonable minds 
could not differ as to its meaning. 116 The court concluded: "The 
Complaint asserts that the defendants knew that the facts contravened 
their 'optimistic' statements that ES was safe, effective, and would be 
approved by the FDA. In this case, we easily conclude that the 
Complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) requirements."117 
7. Pozzi v. Smith 
In Pozzi v. Smith, 118 an electronics and software company, Quad 
Systems Corp., could not invoke the bespeaks caution doctrine because 
the company's use of cautionary language was qualified. 119 Quad 
disclosed certain problems it was having with its software, but qualified 
the disclosures by saying that the problems were not unusual and could 
be satisfactorily resolved. 120 The court concluded: "Thus, even 
though Quad made certain cautionary statements about software 
limitations and bugs (which it soft-pedaled by describing them as not 
unusual), it was simultaneously hiding the effect of those problems on 
the Company's business .... " 121 
114. Id. at 1082. 
115. 74 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996). 
116. Id. at 959-60. 
117. Id. at 960. 
118. Pozzi v. Smith, (1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 98,967 
(Dec. I, I 995). 
119. Id. at 93,666. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 93,669. 
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V. USE OF FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENT INFORMATION 
Except in self-dealing transactions, such as going private transactions, 
projections are overwhelmingly not used in public offering documents. 
This is primarily attributed to the wave of securities fraud class action 
suits challenging even the slightest misstatement regarding predictive 
expression. 122 
The SEC has made an effort to promote more forward-looking 
information through its emphasis on MD&A in its Concept Release, m 
issued last year, designed to implement reform to the 1979 safe harbor 
rules. The Concept Release included eight alternative proposals to the 
safe harbor rules and solicited comment on over seventy questions. 
Despite the large number of alternative proposals and widespread support 
for expanding the safe harbor rules, during 1995 it became clear that the 
SEC would not create a new safe harbor rule as recent legislative 
activity replaced the SEC initiative. 
A. Recent Decisions 
The courts have also recently issued rulings which help minimize 
exposure resulting from the use of forward-looking statements. For 
example, in Herman v. Legent Corp., 124 Thomas Herman, representa-
tive for a class of investors in Legent Corporation, brought a "fraud on 
the market" securities fraud class action, alleging that Legent made a 
series of fraudulent public statements about its future performance that 
inflated the value of Legent's stock over a six-month period. 125 On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the statements of future performance 
were not fraudulent. 126 
The opinion seems, on its face, to restrict the scope of securities fraud 
in actions pertaining to public predictions of future performance. The 
court proclaims that statements regarding projections of future perfor-
mance are actionable under Section lO(b) and Rule l0b-5 only if they 
are supported by specific statements of fact or are worded as guaran-
122. See Christie Harlan, SEC Seeks To Beef Up "Safe Harbor" Provision, WALL 
ST. J., May 17, 1994, at Bl (noting that of 218 companies responding to a Journal 
survey, more than one-half indicated that the prospect of shareholder litigation affected 
the dissemination of forward-looking information). 
123. Concept Release and Notice of Hearing: Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking 
Statements, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7101, 59 Fed. Reg. 52723 (Oct. 1994). 
124. 1995 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 98,650 (I 995). 
125. Id. at 92,003. 
126. Id. at 92,0 I 0. 
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tees.127 The "specific statements of fact" would have to be extremely 
specific to qualify, such as statements referring to specific business 
projects. 128 Otherwise, such "soft" or "puffing" statements involving 
optimistic opinions or predictions of future performance are not material, 
and thus not actionable as a matter of law. Companies are to be given 
freedom to prognosticate. 
Other courts have relied on the bespeaks caution doctrine to dismiss 
claims based on faulty projections. In Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin 
Assoc., Ltd., 129 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
grant of summary judgment to defendants under the bespeaks caution 
doctrine. The Court noted that "when an offering document's projec-
tions are accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements and specific 
warnings of the risks involved, that language may be sufficient to render 
the alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of 
law."130 
Many other decisions during 1995 were unsympathetic to suits 
claiming the use of false or misleading forward-looking information. 
Various reasons were used to support dismissals of such claims: The 
statements were too vague to be material,131 the statements merely 
expressed general enthusiasm,132 and the forward-looking statements 
had a reasonable basis. 133 As is always the situation, however, some 
courts have upheld complaints based on allegations similar to the ones 
other courts have dismissed. 134 
B. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
December 1995 was a month of high drama for securities profession-
als. Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
127. Id. at 92,005. 
128. Id. 
129. 45 F.3d 399 (I Ith Cir. 1995). 
I 30. Id. at 400. 
131. Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1995). 
132. Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 894 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
133. In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., [I 995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep (CCH) '1198,762 (Dec. 29, 1995). See also Jonathan Eisenberg, Securities 
Litigation: Courts Are Increasingly Willing to Dismiss Weak Claims, INSIGHTS, Sept. 
1995, at 11. 
134. E.g., In re Valence Tech. Sec. Litig., (1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) 'I! 98,793 (May 8, 1995); In re Clearly Canadian Sec. Litig., 875 F. Supp. 
1410 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
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1995 (Reform Act)135 and sent it to the White House. Most observers 
thought that President Clinton would sign the legislation, but at the last 
minute he vetoed it. 136 Both Houses quickly overrode the veto and the 
Reform Act became law before the end of the year. 137 According to 
the Conference Report (Report), Congress sought to limit abusive, 
manipulative, and frivolous securities litigation and "to protect investors, 
issuers and all those who are associated with our capital markets."138 
The Reform Act operates on a number of levels: 
• Class action procedures, including the mechanics of 
settlement, have been significantly tightened. 
• A system of proportional liability has in many instances 
replaced joint and several liability. 
• Pleading standards have been raised, especially regarding 
"state of mind allegations." 
• In certain circumstances, discovery has been limited. 
• Auditors are required to report illegal acts. 
• The SEC-but not private parties-is expressly authorized 
to prosecute for aiding and abetting violations. 
• More specific direction is provided regarding the calcula-
tion of damages and the necessity to prove loss causation. 
• Except for when there has been a criminal conviction, 
"any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in 
the purchase or sale of securities" cannot be the predicate 
for a violation of RICO. rn 
• A safe-harbor has been added to both the 1933 and 1934 
Acts for a "forward looking statement." 
The focus of this section will be on the new safe harbor provisions, 
although the other provisions of the Reform Act are extremely important 
and will change the landscape of securities litigation. It is too early to 
tell, but we "forecast": 
• It will take considerable litigation and many years to flush 
out the meaning of the new legislation. 
135. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (West Supp. 1995) (codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Reform Act]. 
136. Presidential Veto Message on the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 
(1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,i 85,714, at 87,234-35 (Dec. 20, 
1995). 
137. The Reform Act does not affect or apply to any private securities action 
commenced and pending before the Act was adopted. 
138. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730. 
139. Reform Act, supra note 135, Tit. I, § I 07. 
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• It will most likely reduce frivolous litigation, but "serious" 
suits will be more costly to defend and more expensive to 
settle. 
• Proportionate liability may turn out to be a double-edged 
sword. 
• While the contours of the safe harbor provisions are not 
fully formed, they will in all probability reduce the 
number of suits filed based upon the use of forward 
looking information and be of considerable value to 
defendants defending against such claims. 
The safe harbor provisions are rather simple. They apply to both 
written and oral statements made by or on behalf of a reporting 
issuer. 140 To fall within the safe harbor provisions, a forward-looking 
statement must satisfy the following: 
( 1) IN GENERAL.-
( A) The forward-looking statement is---
(i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is 
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identi-
fying important factors that could cause actual results to 
differ materially from those in the forward-looking 
statement; or 
(ii) immaterial; or 
(B) The plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking 
statement-
(i) if made by a natural person, was made with actual 
knowledge by that person that the statement was false or 
misleading; or 
(ii) if made by a business entity; was---
(I) made by or with the approval of an execu-
tive officer of that entity, and 
140. Id. § 102. The safe-harbor provisions apply to statements made by an issuer, 
a person acting on behalf of an issuer, an outside reviewer retained by the issuer or an 
underwriter. Id. § I 02(a). The term "person acting on behalf of an issuer" is further 
defined to mean an officer, director or employee of the issuer. Id. 
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(II) made or approved by such officer with 
actual knowledge by that officer that the statement 
was false or misleading. 
(2) ORAL FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS.-
(A) If the oral forward-looking statement is accompanied by 
a cautionary statement-
(B) 
( i) that the particular oral statement is a forward-
looking statement; and 
(ii) that the actual results could differ materially from 






the oral forward-looking statement is accompanied 
by an oral statement that additional information 
. . . is contained in a readily available written 
document, or portion thereof;141 
the accompanying oral statement . . . identifies 
[where to locate the additional information]; and 
the [additional] information contained in that 
written document is a cautionary statement that 
satisfies the standard established in paragraph 
(l )(A).142 
Forward-looking information is broadly defined to include: 143 
• Projections of revenues, income, earnings per share, 
capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other 
financial i terns. 
• Plans and objectives of management for future operations, 
including future products or services. 
• Future economic performance, including any statement 
contained in MD&A. The assumptions underlying any of 
the foregoing. 
• A report issued by an outside reviewer to the extent that 
it assesses a forward- looking statement made by the 
issuer. 
14 I. "Readily available information" means any "document filed with the 
Commission or generally disseminated." See H.R. CoNF. REP., supra note 138, at 45. 
142. Reform Act, supra note 135, Title I, § 102(a)(c)(l)-(2). 
143. Id. § 102(a)(i)(l)(A)-(F). 
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• Statements containing projections that may be covered by 
specific rules of the SEC. 
Very importantly, the Reform Act specifically provides that the safe 
harbor provisions do not impose a duty to update forward-looking 
statements. 144 The SEC, moreover, is expressly granted authority to 
craft additional safe harbors.145 
There a number of specific and important exclusions from the safe 
harbor: 146 
• Forward-looking statements by certain issuers are exclud-
ed: 
Those with a "bad boy" history. 
Forward-looking statements made by a blank check 
company in connection with an offering of its 
securities. 
Penny stock issuers. 
An issuer who makes a forward-looking statement 
in connection with a roll-up transaction. 
An issuer who makes a forward-looking statement 
in connection with a going private transaction. 
• Forward-looking statements made in certain SEC forms or 
in certain transactions are excluded: 147 
Statements made in certified financial statements. 
Statements made by investment companies. 
Statements made in connection with a tender offer. 
Statements made in connection with an IPO. 
Statements made in connection with an offering by, 
or relating to the operation of, partnerships, limited 
liability companies, or direct participation invest-
ment programs. 
Statements made concerning beneficial ownership 
in Schedules 13D. 
The Report emphasizes that part of the foundation for adopting the 
safe harbor is to encourage companies to disclose forward-looking 
144. Id. § 102(a)(d). 
145. Id. § 102(a)(g). 
146. Id. § 102(a)(b)(l)(A)-(E). 
147. Id. § 102(a)(b)(2)(A)-(F). 
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information. It also furnishes some helpful legislative history that will 
be useful in interpreting and applying the new safe harbor provisions: 
• Boilerplate warnings do not qualify as "meaningful 
cautionary statements"----the cautionary statements must 
convey substantive information that realistically could 
cause results to differ from those projected.148 
• "Important factors" need to be identified, but not "all 
factors" nor "the particular factor that ultimately causes 
the forward-looking statement not to come true."149 
• The courts, "where appropriate," are invited to decide 
motions to dismiss "without examining the state of mind 
of the defendant."150 
• A second prong of the safe harbor does focus on the state 
of the mind of the person making the forward-looking 
statement: Such person will not be liable in a private 
action "unless a plaintiff proves that person or business 
entity made a false or misleading forward-looking state-
ment with actual knowledge that it was false or mislead-
ing. "1s1 
• The Conference Committee has established the safe harbor 
as a "starting point" and "fully expects" the SEC to 
continue rulemaking procedures in this area. 
Client education concerning the Reform Act is essential. Emphasis 
should be on the development of"meaningful cautionary statements" and 
the adoption of procedures to implement the oral safe harbor, including 
the magic language in the oral statement and identifying and publishing 
the "readily available written document." 
C. Duty to Update 
The cases discussed below, including the well-publicized case 
Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 152 suggest that issuers have a duty to 
update statements which were accurate when made, but which become 
inaccurate due to subsequent developments. These cases confuse the 
148. H.R. CONF. REP., supra note 138, at 43. The cases applying the bespeaks 
caution doctrine will clearly be useful in interpreting the term "meaningful cautionary 
statements." Indeed, the Report states that the Conference Committee does not intend 
that the safe harbor provisions replace the bespeaks caution doctrine or to stop further 
development of that doctrine by the courts. Id. at 46. 
149. Id. at 43-44. 
150. Id. at 44. 
151. Id. at 44. 
152. [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 94,899 (Jan. 23, 
1990), withdrawn, 910 F .2d IO ( I st Cir. I 990) ( en bane). 
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duty to correct and the duty not to mislead. If an issuer makes a 
statement that is not accurate or is misleading based on the facts and 
circumstances existing at the time of such statement, then the issuer has 
a duty to correct such misstatements. That is not to say that an issuer 
has a duty to update statements which are accurate when made, but later 
become inaccurate or misleading due to a change of facts and circum-
stances. There is virtually no precedent for the proposition that either 
the duty to correct or the duty not to mislead requires that issuers update 
prior statements which were accurate when made. Unfortunately, these 
decisions would impose upon issuers an obligation to continually 
disclose all material information during the period between SEC reports. 
In fact, these cases are misconstrued duty not to mislead claims. The 
duty to update theory is a misnomer which threatens to negate the 
established principle that an independent trigger of a duty to disclose is 
a distinct element of a Rule lOb-5 action. Although a narrower duty to 
update only so-called forward-looking statements appears more palatable, 
in practice it would be an unworkable and dangerous precedent. Such 
a duty to update prior disclosures would discourage issuers from making 
disclosure in the first place, and, therefore, is counterproductive to a 
system which encourages timely voluntary disclosure of material 
information. 153 Nevertheless, issuers should be aware that there is a 
clear trend to re~uire such a duty, as the recent case, In re Time Warner 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 1 4 illustrates. 
J. Backman v. Polaroid Corporation 
If bad facts make bad law, then the opinion by a panel of the First 
Circuit in Backman v. Polaroid Corporation 155 shows that unique 
circumstances also can produce bad law. The panel's opinion, recently 
withdrawn and vacated, would have imposed upon Polaroid a broad duty 
to disclose material adverse developments concerning its new instant 
153. See, e.g., Carl W. Schneider, Update on the Duty to Update: Did Polaroid 
Produce the Instant Movie After All?, 23 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 83 (1990); Carl W. 
Schneider, The Uncertain Duty to Update-Polaroid II Brings a Welcome Limitation, 
INSIGHTS, Oct. 1990, at 2; Carl W. Schneider, The Duty to Update: Time Requires a 
Reevaluation of Basics, INSIGHTS, Apr. 1994, at 2. 
154. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993). 
155. [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I( 94,899 (Jan. 23, 
1990), withdrawn, 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990) (en bane). 
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movie system called "Polavision" solely to update prior statements 
which, although accurate when made, were rendered inaccurate by 
subsequent adverse developments. The panel would have imposed this 
interim period disclosure obligation even though it was unable to 
conclude that Polaroid was either trading in its own securities or making 
statements which, without an update, would have been otherwise 
misleading. 
Fortunately, the court's opinion was withdrawn and the judgment 
vacated. After a rehearing en bane, the First Circuit held that Polaroid's 
statements could not have been considered misleading when made, nor 
did they ever become misleading in light of subsequent events. 156 
Nevertheless, because the full court did not completely reject the notion 
that certain forward-looking statements could require further disclosure, 
the Polaroid case merits close attention to prevent the so-called duty to 
update from receiving further credibility. 
a. Unique Circumstances: The Third Quarter Report, 
Polavision Problems, and the Foundation Stock Sale 
Polaroid introduced its much-heralded Polavision with a massive ad 
campaign in the Spring of 1978, projecting sales of200,000 units for the 
year. 157 By October, the company had adjusted projected sales to 
100,000 units and ordered a decrease in production at its supplier. 158 
Polaroid temporarily ceased all production of Polavision in November 
to deplete excess inventory. On both occasions, Polaroid requested 
secrecy from its supplier concerning the cutbacks. In early December, 
1978 Polaroid circulated among upper management a forecast estimating 
1978 sales of Polavision at 97,000 units. 159 
Polaroid's Third Quarter Report to Stockholders, issued on November 
5, 1978, emphasized increased earnings, boominfl sales and record 
manufacturing output for the company as a whole. 60 These represen-
tations were true and correct in every respect. The report made only the 
following direct reference to Polavision: "[The President] noted also that 
earnings continue to reflect substantial expenses associated with 
Polavision, Polaroid's new system of instant movies."161 The report 
also attributed a major part of the company's increase in the ratio of cost 
of sales to net sales for the first nine months of the year and the third 
156. 910 F.2d at 16-18. 
157. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 94,899 at 94,938. 
158. Id. at 94,939. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 94,938. 
161. Id. at 94,956 (alteration in original). 
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quarter, to "substantial expenses associated with Polavision."162 These 
statements also were true. 
On January 9, 1979, the Rowland Foundation, a charitable organiza-
tion run by Dr. Edwin Land, Polaroid's founder, Chairman, and CEO, 
issued a press release through Polaroid's public relations department 
announcing its intent to sell 300,000 Polaroid shares. 163 The press 
release had been reviewed by Polaroid's in-house counsel and the 
Foundation's attorney, a vice-president and director of Polaroid. The 
press release cited the Foundation's desire to diversify as its reasons for 
the sale and mentioned Dr. Land's impending retirement as Chairman 
and CEO of Polaroid. The release made no reference to Polavision. 
The stock was sold on January 11, 1979 for $52 per share. 
On January 15, 1979, Polaroid circulated to management an internal 
report estimating fourth quarter earnings slightly lower than anticipated, 
and recommending a reserve for additional Polavision expenditures. 164 
Polaroid booked a reserve of $6.8 million for Polavision losses on 
February 1. At the close of the market on February 22, 1979, Polaroid 
issued a press release announcing a twenty-six percent increase in 
earnings for fiscal year 1978 and earnings per share of $1.32 for the 
fourth quarter. The release further disclosed that Polavision had incurred 
manufacturing and marketing expenses "substantially in excess of 
revenues" and that the project would continue to make such demands on 
cash and earnings in 1979.165 Polaroid's stock fell from almost $50 
on February 22 to $43 on February 23, stabilizing at about $40 by 
March 1. 
Plaintiffs sued, alleging that Polaroid misled investors by intentionally 
de-emphasizing the Polavision difficulties when it announced record 
earnings for the third quarter. 166 The plaintiffs alleged that Polaroid 
had a duty to disclose the subsequent Polavision production cuts and the 
December and January internal reports to prevent the Third Quarter 
Report from "becoming misleading."167 Finally, the plaintiffs asserted 
that the press release announcing the Foundation stock sale was 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 94,939. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
I 66. Id. at 94,939-40. 
167. Id. at 94,940. 
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misleading because it did not discuss the adverse developments in the 
Polavision project. 
After a bifurcated trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and 
awarded an aggregate of $9.75 per share in damages to all the class 
participants. 168 Polaroid appealed the verdict, arguing that it never 
uttered any misleading statements or engaged in any conduct that would 
trigger a duty to disclose. Polaroid also challenged the jury instructions 
regarding materiality and the duty to disclose. 
b. Duty to Disclose-No Misstatements 
The First Circuit panel in Polaroid held that the trial judge's 
instructions to the jury regarding Rule l0b-5 improperly equated the 
duty to disclose with materiality and failed to specify the events that 
would trigger a duty to disclose. 169 Writing for the panel, Judge 
Bownes properly stated the circumstances that would trigger an 
obligation to disclose material information: "1) when a 'corporate insider 
trades on confidential information,' 2) when a corporation has made 
'inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading prior disclosures,' and 3) when a 
statute or regulation requires disclosure."170 
The panel also determined that the Third Quarter Report was accurate 
and not misleading at the time of its issuance. 171 Due to its significant 
involvement in the Rowland Foundation press release, the panel found 
that Polaroid was responsible for its content. Judge Bownes expressed 
significant reservations, however, that the release, standing alone, would 
provide an adequate basis to impose liability on Polaroid for the alleged 
omissions. 
c. Bad Law: The Duty to Update 
Notwithstanding that the Third Quarter Report was accurate and not 
misleading when made, the panel held that a reasonable jury could 
conclude that the report "became misleading" once Polaroid ordered the 
November production halts and had assembled earnings estimates 
showing poor fourth quarter performance. The panel asserted that even 
though the statements were accurate when made, "a duty to disclose can 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 94,939-40. The panel also found that the trial judge failed to specifically 
instruct the jury with respect to the good faith defense to scienter. Id. The Rule I 0b-5 
scienter requirement is beyond the scope of this article. 
170. Id. at 94,942 (citing Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26-27 (1st 
Cir. I 987)). 
171. Id. at 94,950. 
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arise if a company possesses material facts that must be released in order 
to render prior statements not misleading."172 Therefore, rather than 
overturn the jury verdict, the First Circuit panel ordered a new trial. 
d. Dubious Relief' The En Banc Opinion 
In the opinion en bane, the First Circuit reasserted that a duty to 
disclose would arise only if the issuer is either trading in its own 
securities, has made prior inaccurate statements, or is required by a 
specific statute or regulation. 173 The full court also concluded that 
Polaroid's statements in the Third Quarter Report about Polavision's 
negative effect on earnings were complete and accurate when made, and 
remained true and correct at all times thereafter. 174 The court ruled 
that Polaroid had satisfied its obligations by disclosing that Polavision 
was being sold below cost. 175 The court rejected the claim that 
Polaroid misled investors by electing not to say how much below 
cost.176 The court stated that the duty not to mislead "does not mean 
that by revealing one fact about a product, one must reveal all others 
that, too, would be interesting, market-wise, but means only such others, 
if any, that are needed so that what was revealed would not be 'so 
incomplete as to mislead. "'177 
Finding no evidence in the record to suggest that Polaroid knew by 
November that Polavision was a commercial failure, the court refused to 
consider the Polavision statements misleading simply because the Third 
Quarter Report omitted to mention exact sales figures. 
The court also confirmed that if the Polavision statements had been 
misleading when made, Polaroid would have had a duty to correct 
them. 178 Because the Polavision statements remained true and correct 
at all times after their utterance, no duty to correct ever arose. As for 
the so-called duty to update, the full court stated that "in special circum-
stances, a statement, correct at the time, may have a forward intent and 
172. Id. at 94,944. 




177. Id. at 16 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 
I 968)). 
178. Id. at 16-17. 
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connotation upon which parties may be expected to rely. If this is a 
clear meaning, and there is a change, correction, more exactly, further 
disclosure, may be called for."179 
The court acknowledged that it need not face that question, however, 
because even if the Polavision statements were forward-looking, they 
remained precisely correct after their release. 180 Hence, the court's 
statements as to the duty to update are dicta.181 
e. A Bad Precedent 
Although the First Circuit's rejection of a broad duty to update is a 
welcome relief, the dicta language suggesting that certain forward-
looking statements require further disclosure is very troubling. To 
distinguish statements of present fact from purely speculative and 
forward- looking disclosure is practically impossible. Issuers also have 
no reasonable guidance as to the duration of viability of such statements 
in the market. Because of the compliance difficulties it presents, 
acceptance of even a limited duty to update would eviscerate the 
traditional rule that issuers have no general duty to disclose. 
Various commentators and the SEC have long recognized the peculiar 
problems raised by forward-looking statements, speculative analysis, and 
projections. 182 The SEC has historically accepted a modicum of 
"touting" as an acceptable business practice and has adopted Rule 175 
179. Id. at 17. 
180. Id. at 17-18. 
181. Ironically, Judge Bownes' dissent to the opinion en bane provides a better 
discussion of the disclosure issue than that given in the majority opinion. See id. at 18 
(Bownes, J., dissenting). Judge Bownes admits that the language in the panel opinion 
could be construed as creating an overly broad "duty to update" past accurate statements 
of historical fact and that no such "duty to update" should exist. Id. at 21. Unfortunate-
ly, Judge Bowne also stated that the duty to correct should apply to forward-looking 
statements which remain "alive" and become inaccurate due to events that occur while 
the statement is still viable in the marketplace. Id. (quoting Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 
465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y 1979)). 
182. Carl W. Schneider describes statements which could possibly warrant a "duty 
to update" because of an "implied representation and/or reasonable expectation of 
continuity." See Schneider, Update on the Duty to Update: Did Polaroid Produce the 
Instant Movie After All?, supra note 153, at 86. Schneider states that if a company 
announces a long-term contract award which would double its sales, and loses that 
contract months later, then the company should have to disclose the loss of that contract, 
solely because of its prior disclosure. Management should be entitled, however, to 
exercise its business judgment and delay disclosure of this information to assess the 
impact on the business and develop strategies to counter any losses. See Dirks v. SEC, 
463 U.S. 646,658 n.17 (1981). Regardless, the company's next MD&A would require 
disclosure of the contract, loss if the company's liquidity or capital resources would be 
affected, or if the cancellation would cause the historical financial data in the report not 
to be indicative of future operating results or financial condition. 
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as a safe harbor to encourage issuers to provide projections of future 
performance, estimates, and forecasts. 183 A duty to continually update 
all material statements, including forward-looking statements, would 
discourage voluntary disclosure and undermine the SEC's efforts in this 
regard. 
To undermine the doctrine of timely disclosure in this manner appears 
particularly short-sighted given the development of the MD&A as a 
quarterly disclosure vehicle, requiring issuers to disclose all material 
changes or subsequent developments in their 10-Q reports. Because 
virtually all such material changes relating to forward-looking statements 
would be encompassed by the MD&A, courts should refuse to eliminate 
the flexibility and business judgment afforded management under the 
current regulatory scheme. 
2. In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation 
After the takeover by Time of Warner, the resulting company faced a 
substantial debt. Time Warner embarked on a highly publicized 
campaign to find international "strategic partners" who would infuse it 
with billions of dollars of capital. This plan was unsuccessful, however, 
and Time Warner resorted to a stock offering that had the effect of 
diluting the rights of the existing shareholders, some of whom brought 
this lawsuit, In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig. 184 The plaintiffs 
alleged that Time Warner and certain executives misled the investing 
public by making certain statements and omissions that were generally 
optimistic about the progress of the "strategic partnerships" and never 
indicated the actual difficulties. 
The district court considered two categories of misstatements: ( 1) 
press releases and public statements from the individual defendants and 
(2) unofficial statements from unnamed sources given to analysts and the 
press. With regard to the first category, the court found that the 
statements indicating that talks were ongoing were accurate when made, 
and that later attempts did not give rise to a duty to correct or update the 
statements. As to the second category, the court concluded that the 
183. Rule 175 generally provides a safe harbor for projections that are made with 
a reasonable basis and in good faith. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (I 994). For a discussion 
regarding efforts to amend the safe harbor rule, see supra Part V.B. 
184. 794 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
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defendants could not be held responsible for any of the unattributed 
statements and that the statements were not actionable for the same 
reasons that the attributed statements were not actionable. The district 
court then dismissed the complaint for failure to plead adequately either 
material misrepresentations or omissions attributable to the defendants, 
and for failure to plead scienter adequately. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed and partially 
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. 185 The court discussed, 
among other matters, two updating issues with regard to the attributed 
statements and corporate press releases: (I) failure to disclose problems 
in the strategic alliance negotiations and (2) failure to disclose the active 
consideration of an alternate method of raising capital. 
With regard to the first issue, the plaintiffs' theory is that the 
defendants' statements hyping strategic alliances gave rise to a duty to 
disclose problems in the alliance negotiations as those problems 
developed. The court found, however, that the attributed public 
statements "lack the sort of definitive positive projections that might 
require later correction."186 Thus, these statements "did not become 
materially misleading when the talks did not proceed well."187 
Addressing the second issue of the failure to disclose alternative 
methods of raising capital, the Court of Appeals found that the 
information about the consideration of the stock offering alternative was 
material because the offering could have a negative effect on the market 
price for the company's stock. 188 The court then considered whether 
there was a duty to disclose the omitted fact. The court stated: 
Time Warner's public statements could have been understood by reasonable 
investors to mean that the company hoped to solve the entire debt problem 
through strategic alliances. Having publicly hyped strategic alliances, Time 
185. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993). 
186. Id. at 267. 
187. Id. The court added in a footnote: 
Although the statements are generally open-ended, there is one sense in which 
they have a solid core. The statements represent as fact that serious talks with 
multiple parties were ongoing. If this factual assertion ceased to be true, 
defendants would have had an obligation to update their earlier statements. 
But the complaint does not allege that the talks ever stopped or ceased to be 
"serious," just that they eventually went poorly. 
Id. at n.4. Carl W. Schneider argues that this footnote should be interpreted to require 
at most "terminal" disclosures, i.e., when either an agreement is reached or the "serious" 
negotiations end with no agreement. Schneider, The Duty to Update: Time Requires a 
Reevaluation of Basics, supra note 153, at 2, 4. Thus, updating disclosures during the 
course of ongoing negotiations should not be required. Further, it is unclear whether the 
duty to update would arise if the terms being negotiated were announced but were 
subsequently changed materially during the course of negotiations. Id. 
188. 9 F.3d at 267. 
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Warner may have come under a duty to disclose facts that would place the 
statements concerning strategic alliances in a materially different light. 189 
The court concluded that, "when a corporation is pursuing a specific 
business goal and announces that goal as well as an intended approach 
for reaching it, it may come under an obligation to disclose other 
approaches to reaching the goal when those approaches are under active 
and serious consideration."190 
3. Good v. Zenith Electronics Corporation 
Unfortunately, the duty to update refuses to die a rational death. In 
Good v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 191 the district cowt suggested that 
Zenith may have violated a duty to update certain earnings projections 
which were accurate and reasonable when made, but subsequently 
proved unattainable. 192 Zenith's 1988 Annual Report stated that the 
company "expect[ed] further profit improvements in 1989."193 On 
April 25, 1989, Zenith reported a $4 million first quarter loss. The 
release stated that the company's initial forecasts had anticipated the loss 
and confirmed that the company still expected profit improvement for 
the full year. On July 21, 1989, Zenith reported a $13 million loss for 
the second quarter. The price of Zenith stock fell significantly. The 
plaintiffs alleged that Zenith's April statements confirming the initial 
projections and projecting profit improvement constituted securities 
fraud.194 
In denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment, Judge Bua 
held that Zenith may have violated Rule lOb-5 by confirming the prior 
earnings projections at a time that the company may have been in 
possession of information which undermined the accuracy of such 
projections. 195 It is unclear from the opinion whether Zenith actually 
had actual knowledge of facts contradicting the initial projections, 
because certain materials relating to this charge were submitted under 
189. Id. at 268. 
190. Id. 
191. 751 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
I 92. Id. at 1322. 
193. Id. at 1321 (quoting Statement of Uncontested Facts in Support of Defendants' 
Summary Judgment Motion at ~ 6). 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 1323. 
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seal. Any voluntary confirmatory statements, if made at a time when the 
company had reason to believe that the initial projections were no longer 
accurate, would likely violate the duty not to mislead. 
Unfortunately, Judge Bua went on to state that Zenith also may have 
had a "duty to update" the initial projections, which were accurate when 
made, "if additional information became known to the parties that 
changed the meaning of the statement."196 Because Zenith's April 
statements apparently were inaccurate, Judge Bua need not have 
attributed his ruling to an independent duty to update the initial 
projections and his statements in this regard are dicta. 197 
4. Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc. 
Although the debate is far from over, the Seventh Circuit reRaired 
some of the damage in Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc. 98 In 
Stransky, Cummins Engine Co. issued optimistic press releases regarding 
its newly redesigned engines, and later discovered that warranty costs 
were skyrocketing because of faulty design problems. 199 Alan 
Stransky filed a class action suit for securities fraud and based the case 
(at least partially) on a duty to update. The court noted that some legal 
scholars have argued that a duty to update arises when a company makes 
a forward-looking statement that, because of subsequent events, becomes 
untrue.200 The court emphatically stated, however, that "[t]his court 
has never embraced such a theory, and we decline to do so now."201 
The Seventh Circuit explained that Rule lOb-5 implicitly precludes 
liability in circumstances that arise after the speaker makes the state-
ment.202 It commented that "the securities laws typically do not act as 
I 96. Id. at 1322. 
197. Another case where the court applied the "duty to update" is In re Kulicke & 
Soffa Indus. Sec. Litig., 747 F. Supp. 1136, 1147-49 (E.D. Pa. 1990), where the jury 
responded in special interrogatories that an issuer had a duty to disclose material 
information which rendered a prior projected sales forecast misleading, even though 
defendants made no statements supporting the projections once the projections became 
unattainable. However, both the jury and the court found that defendants lacked scienter 
in their failure to correct the forecast immediately. The court in In re Meridian Sec. 
Litig., 772 F. Supp. 223, 227 (E.D. Pa. 1991), suggested that an issuer had a duty to 
correct and update between periodic reports its optimistic statements regarding certain 
successful business operations after difficulties arose. However, in Capri Optics Profit 
Sharing v. Digital Equip., 760 F. Supp. 227 (D. Mass. 1991), the court cited Polaroid 
and rejected the claim that an issuer had a duty to disclose "additional information" 
regarding expected company performance. 
198. 51 F.3d 1329 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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a Monday Morning Quarterback,"203 and it noted that the secunt1es 
laws approach matters from an ex ante perspective. Consequently, 
forward-looking statements can lead to liability only if they are 
unreasonable in light of the facts known at the time. 
The duty to update thus appears to have been eliminated, at least in 
the Seventh Circuit. The huge question now is whether the other courts 
will see the light and follow the lead of Stransky.204 
VI. FREE RIDING INTERPRETATION 
On March 18, 1994, the National Association of Securities Dealers, 
Inc. (NASD) filed with the SEC certain rule changes to the NASD "free-
riding" interpretation of the NASD Manual of Rules of Fair Practice.205 
These changes were approved by the SEC on December 7, 1994.206 
Some of the key changes to the interpretation include the following: 
1. Stand-by Arrangements 
The prior interpretation restricted sales to "stand-by" purchasers in 
certain instances by disallowing persons restricted under the prior 
interpretation from having a beneficial interest in a "stand-by" account. 
The new interpretation now provides that securities purchased pursuant 
to a "stand-by" arrangement (an agreement to purchase securities not 
purchased during the offering) are not subject to the provisions of the 
interpretation if: ( 1) the "stand-by" is disclosed in the prospectus, (2) 
the "stand-by" arrangement is the subject of a formal written agreement, 
(3) the managing underwriter represents in writing that it was unable to 
find any other purchasers for the securities, and (4) the securities 
203. Id. 
204. Such a trend appears to be developing already. The opinion in In re Cypress 
Semiconductor Sec. Litig., 891 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1995), echoes the Seventh 
Circuit distaste for the duty to update: "All of Cypress forward-looking statements had 
a reasonable basis at the time they were made, which is the only time that matters as far 
as the securities laws are concerned." Id. at 1381. 
205. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the NASD's Free-Riding 
and Withholding Interpretation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-34485, 59 Fed. Reg. 
40,933 (August 3, 1994). 
206. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the NASD's Free-Riding 
and Withholding Interpretation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-35059, 59 Fed. Reg. 
64,455 (Dec. 7, 1994) [hereinafter NASD Release]. 
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purchased are restricted from sale or transfer for a period of three 
months.207 
2. Definition of Immediate Family 
The old interpretation restricted immediate family members or persons 
associated with broker/dealers and persons having a connection to the 
offering and individuals related to banks, insurance companies, and other 
institutional-type accounts, from participating in "hot issue" distributions. 
The amendment to the interpretation now provides that 
the prohibition shall not apply to sales to a member of the immediate family of 
a person associated with a member [who] is not supported directly or indirectly 
to a material extent by such person if the sale is by a broker/dealer other than 
that employing the restricted person and the restricted person has no ability to 
control the allocation of the hot issue. 208 
3. Venture Capital Investors 
The NASD concluded that venture capital investors should be allowed 
to purchase a hot issue to maintain their percentage ownership in an 
entity, notwithstanding that the venture capital investor may be a 
restricted person, or that such person may have a beneficial interest in 
a venture capital account. The new interpretation therefore provides that 
venture capital investors may purchase hot issues without implicating the 
interpretation's restrictions if: 
(a) there is one year of preexisting ownership in the entity; 
(b) there is no increase in the investor's percentage ownership 
above that held for three months prior to the filing of registra-
tion statement in connection with the initial public offering; 
( c) there is a lack of special terms in connection with the purchase; 
and 
(d) [the] Venture Capital Investor shall not assign, sell, pledge, 
hypothecate or otherwise dispose of the securities for a period 
of three months following the effective date of the registration 
statement in connection with the offering.209 
4. Definition of Public Offering 
The NASD concluded that the definition of "public offering" 
implicated private placements of securities which do not present the 
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abuses that the interpretation was designed to guard against. The 
amended interpretation therefore provides that private placements are not 
within the purview of the interpretation. Specifically, the amended 
interpretation defines a public offering as "any primary or secondary 
distribution of securities made pursuant to a registration statement or 
offering circular . . . of any kind whatsoever except any offering made 
pursuant to an exemption under §4(1), 4(2) or 4(6) of the Securities Act 
of 1933, as amended, or pursuant to Rule 504 ... or Rule 506."210 
VIL ROAD SHOWS 
Road shows are an integral part of the public offering process. They 
serve a useful function as the issuer and its principal officers are 
displayed before potential investors. This leads to incisive questioning 
by experts and produces, in some respects, a negotiated transaction. 
Lawyers generally play a small or nonexistent part in either the road 
show or its preparation. Cautious issuer counsel frequently advises the 
client to confine its presentations at the road show to material included 
in the registration statement, to refrain from making predictions, and not 
to distribute other materials. There is very little case law, and few 
formal SEC rulings, dealing with statements made at road shows. Many 
of the class action securities fraud suits brought in the past few years 
have specifically alleged that the road show is used as a vehicle to create 
demand for the securities by painting an extremely positive picture of the 
issuer and by having the issuer and underwriter both make forecasts that 
the issuer will enjoy continued profit growth. 
In In re Hyperion Sec. Litig.,211 the plaintiffs attempted to bolster 
their allegations of securities fraud through excerpts of informa-
tion-scripts and slides--used during the road shows. The court agreed 
that the "roadshow scripts were more optimistic about risks and returns 
than the prospectuses."212 Despite this, the court, looking at the total 
mix of information available and applying the bespeaks caution doctrine, 
held that the plaintiffs could not "predicate their claims on inferences 
drawn from statements made during the roadshows, if, as here, those 
210. Id. at 64,937. 
211. (1995-96 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,i 98,906 (July 14, 1995). 
212. Id. at 93,362. 
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inferences are contradicted by specific disclosures in the prospectus-
es. "213 
CONCLUSION 
Major developments have recently occurred in the law surrounding 
disclosure. The SEC has not been the principal catalyst, but instead the 
courts and Congress have created these developments. Both are clearly 
signaling that there is far too much securities fraud litigation. Volatile 
markets----especially steep declines-----have generally prompted a rash of 
litigation. Based on the more limiting court decisions and the Reform 
Act, it is likely that the litigation explosion will be reduced. 
213. Id. 
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CAUTIONARY STATEMENTS REGARDING FORWARD-LOOKING 
STATEMENTS MADE IN REGISTRATION DOCUMENTS 
Genus, Inc., S-3 Registration Statement, Feb. 16, 1996, available in 
LEXIS, COMPNY Library, FILING File: 
"This Prospectus contains forward-looking statements that involve 
risks and uncertainties. The Company's actual results may differ 
significantly from the results discussed in the forward-looking state-
ments. Factors that might cause such differences include, but are not 
limited to, the "Risk Factors" described below." 
CNS, Inc., S-3 Registration Statement, Mar. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, 
COMPNY Library, FILING File: 
"An investment in the Common Stock offered hereby involves a high 
degree of risk. In addition to the other information contained in this 
Prospectus, prospective investors should carefully consider the following 
risk factors relating to the business of the Company before making an 
investment. This Prospectus, including the information incorporated by 
reference herein, contains forward-looking statements within the meaning 
of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Actual results could differ significant-
ly from those projected in the forward-looking statements as a result, in 
part, of the risk factors set forth below. In connection with the forward-
looking statements which appear in these disclosures, prospective 
purchasers of the Common Stock offered hereby should carefully review 
the factors set forth in this Prospectus under 'Risk Factors."' 
Molecular Biosystems, Inc., S-3 Registration Statement, Apr. 10, 1996, 
available in LEXIS, COMPNY Library, FILING File: 
"In addition to the other information contained in or incorporated by 
reference into this Prospectus, the following factors should be carefully 
considered in evaluating an investment in the Common Stock offered by 
this Prospectus. This Prospectus contains forward-looking statements 
that involve risks and uncertainties. The Company's actual results could 
differ materially from those discussed in these forward-looking 
statements. Factors that could cause or contribute to such differences 
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include, but are not limited to, those discussed in the following section 
and in 'Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition 
and Results of Operations' and 'Business'." 
Electronic Data Systems Holding Corp., S-4 Registration Statement, Apr. 
22, 1996, available in LEXIS, COMPNY Library, FILING File: 
"This Solicitation Statement/Prospectus contains certain forward-
looking statements and information relating to EDS that are based on the 
beliefs of GM or EDS management as well as assumptions made by and 
information currently available to GM or EDS management. When used 
in this document, the words "anticipate," "believe," "estimate" and 
"expect" and similar expressions, as they relate to GM, EDS or GM or 
EDS management, are intended to identify forward-looking statements. 
Such statements reflect the current views of GM or EDS with respect to 
future events and are subject to certain risks, uncertainties and assump-
tions, including the risk factors described in this Solicitation State-
ment/Prospectus. Should one or more of these risks or uncertainties 
materialize, or should underlying assumptions prove incorrect, actual 
results may vary materially from those described herein as anticipated, 
believed, estimated or expected. Neither GM nor EDS intends to update 
these forward-looking statements." 
Hambrecht & Quist Group, Inc., S-1 Registration Statement, June 20, 
1996, available in LEXIS, COMPNY Library, FILING File: 
"This Prospectus contains forward-looking statements that involve 
risks and uncertainties. Actual results could differ materially from those 
discussed in the forward-looking statements as a result of certain factors, 
including those set forth below and elsewhere in this Prospectus. The 
following factors should be considered carefully in addition to the other 
information contained in this Prospectus before purchasing the common 
stock offered hereby." 
The UniMark Group, Inc., S-3 Registration Statement, June 14, 1996, 
available in LEXIS, COtvIPNY Library, FILING File: 
"The discussion in this Prospectus contains forward-looking statements 
that involve risks and uncertainties. The Company's actual results could 
differ significantly from those discussed herein. Factors that could cause 
or contribute to such differences include, but are not limited to, those 
discussed in "Risk Factors," "Management's Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Results of Operations" and "Business," as well 
as those discussed elsewhere in this Prospectus. Statements contained 
in this Prospectus that are not historical facts are forward-looking 
statements that are subject to the safe harbor created by the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. A number of important 
factors could cause the Company's actual results for 1996 and beyond 
to differ materially from those expressed in any forward-looking 
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statements made by, or on behalf of, the Company. These factors 
include, without limitation, those listed below in 'Risk Factors'." 
APPENDIXB 
CAUTIONARY "SAFE HARBOR" LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN PRESS 
RELEASES PURSUANT TO THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION 
REFORM ACT OF 1995 
Motorola Reports Higher Sales and Earnings for the Full Year 1995, 
Business Wire, Inc., Jan. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, COMPNY 
Library, ALLNWS File: 
'"Safe Harbor' statement under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995: The statements under "Review and Outlook" and 
the other statements which are not historical facts contained in this 
release are forward looking statements that involve risks and uncertain-
ties, including, but not limited to, product demand and market accep-
tance risks, the effect of economic conditions, the impact of competitive 
products and pricing, product development, commercialization and 
technological difficulties, capacity and supply constraints or difficulties, 
the results of financing efforts, actual purchases under agreements, the 
effect of the Company's accounting policies, and other risks detailed in 
the Company's Securities and Exchange Commission filings." 
Motorola Reports Higher First Quarter Results, Business Wire, Inc., 
Apr. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, COMPNY Library, ALLNWS File: 
'"Safe Harbor' statement under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995: The statements quoted in "Review and Outlook" 
and about the Iridium financing negotiations are forward looking and the 
continuation of the factors listed in the first paragraphs of "Review and 
Outlook" and "General Corporate" as well as product and technology 
development and commercialization risks and uncertainties, the outcome 
of these financing negotiations and the factors listed on pages F-10 and 
F-11 of Motorola's 1996 proxy statement appendix and other SEC 
filings could cause Motorola's actual results to differ materially from 
those statements." 
Intel Fourth Quarter Outlook, Business Wire, Inc., Nov. 6, 1996, 
available in LEXIS, COMPNY Library, ALLNWS File: 
"The above statements contained in this outlook are forward-looking 
statements that involve a number of risks and uncertainties. In addition 
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to the factors discussed above, among the other factors that could cause 
actual results to differ materially are the following: business conditions 
and growth in the personal computer industry and general economy; 
change in customer order patterns, including timing of delivery and 
changes in seasonal fluctuations in PC buying patterns; competitive 
factors, such as rival chip architectures, competing software-compatible 
microprocessors, acceptance of new products and price pressures; risk of 
inventory obsolescence due to shifts in market demand; variations in 
inventory valuation; timing of software industry product introductions; 
continued success in technological advances, including the manufacturing 
ramp; excess or shortage of manufacturing capacity; risks associated with 
foreign operations; changes in the mix of microprocessor speeds and 
related motherboards; costs and yield issues associated with production 
at factories; litigation involving intellectual property and consumer 
issues; and other risk factors listed from time to time in the company's 
SEC reports, including but not limited to the report on Form 10-Q for 
the quarter ended June 29, 1996." 
Zebra [Technologies Corporation] Announces First Quarter Financial 
Results, PR Newswire Ass'n Inc., April 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, 
COMPNY Library, ALLNWS File: 
"The estimates contained in this release are forward looking statements 
subject to the safe harbor created by the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995. Management cautioned that these projections are 
estimates of future performance and are highly dependent upon a variety 
of important factors which could cause actual results to differ materially 
from the estimate. These factors include the acceptance of the 
company's printer and software products by the market and product 
offerings made by its competitors. Profits will be affected by the 
company's ability to control manufacturing and operating costs. Due to 
the company's large investment portfolio, interest rate conditions will 
also have an impact on results, as will foreign exchange rates due to the 
large percentage of the company's sales in international markets. 
Readers of this press release are referred to filings with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, and specifically Zebra's prospectus of 
December 7, 1995 for further discussions of factors that could affect 
Zebra's future results." 
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